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Low Union Density Amidst a Conflictive Contentious Repertoire: Flexible




The first part of this paper briefly examines the merits of neo-classical arguments
regarding the causes of the recent upsurge in Greek unemployment.  It shows that the
view according to which high unemployment in Greece is caused by high wages rests
on a weak empirical foundation.  Moreover, by examining features of the Greek
labour market (especially the large and eminently ‘flexible’ informal sector) it
suggests that the experience of Greece casts doubt on the view that labour-market
flexibility can serve as a cure to unemployment.  The second, and major part,
examines trade union decline.  Unlike the situation in most European countries, rising
unemployment has not affected the mobilizing capacity of the Greek labour
movement.  More than a century after its emergence, however, this movement has yet
to overcome its historically embedded low trade-union density.  This does not prevent
the outbreak of militant strikes, but hampers their effectiveness.  In recent years union
leaders have attempted to address this problem by trying to curb the movement’s
traditional penchant for confrontational action, in favour of a co-operative model of
industrial relations.  In the background of a weak and retrenching welfare state,
however, this has led to concession bargaining which, instead of improving, has
further worsened the problem of declining union credibility and density.  The paper
ends with some tentative suggestions on how to reverse this process.
INTRODUCTION
As are most other European nations, Greece is troubled by high and growing
unemployment.  In 1996 (the most recent year for which complete data are available)
10.34% of the economically active were unemployed, up from only 4.04% in 1981
and 7.65% in 1991.  Along with Spain and, to a lesser extent Italy, Greece is now
cited as a high unemployment country in the literature (see, e.g., Symes 1995).  Of the
total number of unemployed, the high rates of unemployment among youth (29.8% in
1995) and long-term unemployment (52.4% in 1995) have been particularly
worrisome.  In both these aspects, Greece ranks above the EU average, though still
*  Please direct all correspondence to Seraphim feriades, Fellow and Tutor, Churchill College,
Cambridge, CB3 0DS, United Kingdom.  This paper was prepared during my stay at the European
University Institute as a Jean Monnet Fellow.  I wish to thank professors Stefano Bartolini and Martin
Rhodes for their valuable comments.
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slightly below the other three southern European countries.  However, whereas youth
and long-term unemployment have been declining in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, in
Greece they have been rising (Eurostat 1996:163).
The way most scholars and policy makers have interpreted growing
unemployment has centred on short and medium-term developments in the labour
market.  The factors most usually cited include the contraction of employment in the
agricultural sector, the increased participation of women in the labour force, and the
restrictive monetary and exchange-rate policies adopted to meet the criteria for
participation in the EMU (see, e.g., Petrinioti 1998; Demekas/Contolemis 1996).
Since very little can be done about any of these factors, however, the argument which
increasingly tends to dominate synthetic and prescriptive analyses is that
unemployment is caused by inordinately high wages and structural rigidities in the
labour market.  According to the most recent European Commission report on the
Greek labour market, ‘real wage increases led to rises in labour costs, lowering
competitiveness, reduction of profits and productive activity, and less employment
creation’.  Moreover, ‘[t]he existing employment protection legislation contributes to
the protection of certain jobs but restricts flexibility, raises costs and reduces
employment opportunities available to those who are out of work’ (European
Commission 1997:38, ix; see also OECD 1996a).  Sometimes one has to read between
the lines of mainstream argumentation, but the generally neo-classical orientation,
venerated not only in Athens but in most European capitals, is quite clear: reduce
wages, dismantle employment protection, and there will be jobs.  The first part of this
article proposes to briefly examine the merits of this contention.  I will begin with an
examination of the relevant data, showing that, since the mid-1980s, wages in Greece
have not been growing, indeed, they have been falling.  Moreover, by briefly
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analyzing features of the Greek labour market (especially the large, and eminently
flexible, ‘informal sector’), I will suggest that, contrary to the predominating
orthodoxy, the experience of Greece casts doubt on the view that labour-market
flexibility can serve as a cure to unemployment.
The issues raised in this first part of the article are, of course, extremely
complex and variegated.  No definitive propositions regarding the causes of Greek
unemployment can be offered.  Nonetheless, the data examined may prompt and assist
the open-ended reflection needed in order to gain a better understanding of the precise
nature of the problem at hand.  This, in turn, can serve as valuable background for the
second, and major, part of the article examining the effect of unemployment on trade
unions.
Here, too, there is an orthodox view (both journalistic and scholarly) to
grapple with.  It can be summarized in just two words: union retreat.  A recent issue of
the influential weekly Ïéê ï í ï ìéêüò Ôá÷õäñüì ïò [Financial Courier (FC)] painted the
following gloomy canvas, replete with normative statements:
The decline of the trade-union movement both in Greece and internationally is
beyond question.  The relevant data on the number of u ionized workers are
overwhelming.  What is even more remarkable is that the general influence of
unions is dwindling.  In other periods the movement could topple governments
and enforce the introduction of legislation.  Nowadays it is fighting not to lose
its voice….Soon the trade-union movement will amount to nothing unless it
changes orientation….The answers the trade-union movement gives to
contemporary problems are outdated and, in practice, lead to its own
decimation.  Restructuring will continue no matter what, and trade unionism is
unable to stop it….Until today, the movement has not succeeded in coming up
with new ideas, neither internationally nor in Greece.  If this continues, the
trade-union movement will be forced to write on its own grave tombstone: ‘I
died because I lacked imagination’. (FC 23 July 1998, my translation)1
1 Trade-union death is a favourite theme of serious European journalism.  The Econo ist of 1
July 1995, for instance, suggested that unions have just one choice: ‘adapt or die’.  In a similar vein, the
European Commission Report cited above argues: ‘In recent years the labour unions have been facing a
crisis of confidence among workers and have experienced losses in their member support and in their
strength.  Their partisan character and their use for political…purposes have disappointed their
membership and have reduced their vigour’ (European Commission 1997:54).
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The gruesome imagery of the last admonition notwithstanding, the
prescription underpinning the analysis is, once again, unmistakable: either accede to
policies of wage restraint and labour-market flexibility and thrive, or resist and perish.
My goal in what follows will be to scrutinize both the analysis and its underlying
policy prescription.  Relying on a conceptual distinction between the institutional-
organizational features of labour movements (principally trade union density) and
their protest outlook (principally their propensity to strike), I will argue that, contrary
to a widespread assumption, the low/declining membership of the Greek trade-union
movement has not entailed a reduced propensity to strike.  This, in turn, casts new
light on the usual objectivist, environmental renderings of the problem of declining
membership as a direct function of high unemployment.  Are factors associated with
capitalist restructuring and rising unemployment all we need to know to interpret
shrinking union membership?  What is the role of union tactics and politics (unions as
strategic actors)?  Finally, is the strategic dilemma facing unions ‘acquiesce and thrive
or resist and perish’, or is it, perhaps, the other way around?
REAL WAGE DECLINE, INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEMPLOYMENT
I
As mentioned above, a large number of scholars and policy analysts claim that
the principal factor explaining contemporary unemployment in Greece has been the
high wages enjoyed by the labour force.2  Data from a variety of sources, however,
present a considerably more complicated picture.  Take for instance, OECD data
concerning the real compensation of employees in the business sector appearing in
2 See, e.g., Demekas/Kontolemis (1996); Oikonomou (1991); Alogoskoufis (1990);
Pavlopoulos (1986).  For an exhaustive review of the relevant literature, see Pelagidis (1997: 111-28).
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Table 1.  (The amounts are expressed in 1991 US dollars, and are calculated using the
implicit price deflator of personal consumption expenditures.)
Table 1: Real Compensation per employee in the business sector (1991 US Dollars)
1980 1985 1990 1994
Greece 14,429 15,848 14,484 12,849
OECD 20,165 20,384 22,332 23,212
Source: OECD (1996b:42)
Real Compensation includes wages, salaries and benefits.
Although it is true that real wages grew between 1980 and 1985, the picture changes
dramatically after 1985.  Whereas in the period 1985-1990 and 1990-1994 employee
compensation in the OECD countries increased by 9.56% and 3.94% respectively, in
Greece it declined by 8.60% and 11.29%.  All the same, unemployment continued to
increase, especially after 1990 (1990-96 unemployment rise: 3.3 percentage points),
when real compensation decline was even more pronounced than between 1985-90.
A detailed image of the annual percentage change in real compensation per
employee comparing Greece and the EU in the period after 1985 is given in the 1994
issue of the European Commission’s European Economy.  The figures, which are
calculated using as a deflator both purchasing power and the GDP, appear in Table 2.
Table 2: Annual percentage change in real compensation per employee (1986-1994)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(1) -7.7 -3.6 3.8 3.0 -1.5 -2.1 -3.0 -1.8 0.9Greece
(2) -4.1 -2.4 2.6 5.0 -2.8 -1.3 -3.2 -1.8 0.7
(1) 2.2 1.7 1.7 0.8 2.5 1.5 1.2 0.2 -0.2EU 12
(2) 0.5 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.9 1.5 1.3 0.4 0.2
Deflator: private consumption (2) Deflator: GDP
Source: European Commission (1994:177)
Real Compensation includes wages, salaries and benefits.
Real compensation declines in all the years except 1988-89 are particularly
striking in that they occurred simultaneously with increases in other EU countries.
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A similar picture emerges from reviewing data on the evolution of real hourly
earnings in manufacturing.  Whereas between 1989 and 1995 they increased by an
average of 1.1% in the EU, in Greece they declined by 0.5% (OECD 1997:100).
Equally revealing is data on the evolution of real unit labour costs depicted in Table 3.
The same table depicts also the evolution of relative unit labour costs against other
EU member countries.
Table 3: Annual change in real and relative unit labour costs 1986-1994
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
Real -5.2 -2.0 -0.1 1.8 -0.5 -6.6 -2.7 -2.4 0.1
Relative against EU-17.6 -4.2 5.4 3.9 1.9 -6.8 -1.4 0.9 2.6
Source: European Commission (1994:177)
Clearly, then, the orthodox thesis explaining unemployment in terms of high
wages rests on a weak foundation.3  And though an adequate explanation lies beneath
the scope of this endeavour,4 our skimpy perusal of the relevant data is sufficient to
3 A related pillar of neo-classical argumentation concerns reduced profitability.  Though,
indeed, the rate of profit fell in the period 1980-85, between 1985 and 1989 it stabilized.  Moreover, as
the table below shows, profit shares in Greece have been consistently higher than their counterpart in
the EU and the OECD.
Profit shares in the business sector in Greece, the EU and the OECD (1974-1991)
Greece EC/EU OECD
1974-79 67.0 43.8 42.9
1980-86 61.9 45.5 43.4
1986 61.5 47.5 44.2
1987 62.6 47.5 44.2
1988 61.7 48.0 44.3
1989 60.4 48.3 43.9
1990 59.9 48.4 43.6
1991 59.6 48.6 43.6
Source: OECD (1989:124)
4 But see Ioakimoglou/Milios (1993), who, operating within a Marxist theoretical framework,
claim that the crisis of the Greek economy stems from decreasing ‘capital efficiency’.  Although the
decline in the surplus value observed in the decade 1975-1985 has been reversed since 1985, capital’s
inability to ‘economize’ continues to fuel crisis.  Ioakimoglou (1993) and Georgakopoulou (1995)
present a similar view.  For a synthesis of recent efforts to explain unemployment in Europe (in terms
of low aggregate demand, structural rigidities of the labour market, and capitalist restructuring), see
Symes (1995:chapter 1).  For a fascinating effort to ground analysis of the causes of unemployment in
sociological theory and the long-term history of labour markets in Britain and the U.S., see Ashton
(1986).
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demonstrate that approaching the problem of unemployment in Greece along neo-
classical lines is theoretically perverse.  The real question, the data seem to suggest, is
not how high wages have led to unemployment, but the converse: how low,
decreasing wages have not been able to prevent the increase of unemployment.5
II
The second pillar of orthodox analyses, regarding rigidities in the labour
market and the need for ‘greater flexibility’, does not fare much better.  The issue, of
course, is extremely complicated.  Bewildering variation in labour-market structures
and policies as well as in scholarly analytical approaches interpreting these policies
make conclusive theorization exceedingly risky and cumbersome (Bamber/Lansbury
1998; Hyman/Ferner 1994; Baglioni/Crouch 1990; Boyer 1988;).
For practical puroses, however, it is possible to distinguish among three kinds
of flexibility.  Numerical flexibility, which denotes employer capacity to hire and fire
employees in response to developments in the business cycle; wage-level flexibility,
referring to a capacity to freely determine wages; and orking-time flexibility, which
gives employers the freedom to extend or shorten the workday (see Moody 1997b:95-
6; Dedousopoulos et al. 1997, 1988; Rhodes 1997:2).
Often conflating the various aspects of the issue, question has been
recently posed in Greece: Is the labour market flexible or rigid?  The answer, of
course, can only be relative, partial, and inconclusive –flexible/rigid compared to
5 Further exploration of this issue may shed important new light on existing analyses about the
likely effects of reduced wages on unemployment.  Debates in the literature seem to diverge on the
issue of whether or not the ‘virtuous circle’ posited by neo-classical economists (reduced wages leading
to increased profitability, leading, in turn, to increased capital formation and productivity) is sufficient
to outweigh the short-term negative effects of reduced wages (depressed consumption and investment
despite the upturn in profitability and the balance of trade, hence moderate or non-existent productivity
growth because of the under-tilization of productive capacity).  The Greek experience would seem to
suggest that it is not.  On this issue, see Ioakimoglou/Milios (1993) and Ioakimoglou (1998, 1997).
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which model?  Even so, it is possible to start providing an answer where we left off in
the discussion of wages.  Though the proponents of further wage-level flexibility are
correct in pointing out that the current system, determining minimum wages at the
national level, could be reformed to allow lower, sub-minimum wages at the local
level (presumably reflecting variations in the supply of and demand for skills), the
fact of universally low wages remains.  It follows that further wage-level flexibility is
unlikely to contribute to any significant job creation.  As one analyst put it, if high,
inflexible wages were a factor in Greek limited competitiveness and unemployment,
then Greece ought to have solved these problems long ago (Kouzis 1997:119).
The issues surrounding the other two, workplace kinds of flexibility are
considerably thornier.  Though Greece has an exceedingly weak welfare state
(Spyropoulos 1998; Stathopoulos 1996; Kritsantonis 1992), elaborate labour-market
legislation regulating employment and working time (most of it introduced in the
1980s) remains in place.  Law 1387/1983 sets limits for the maximum number of
employees who can be dismissed (2-3% per month), while other pieces of legislation
regulate overtime, weekly rest periods, holidays, night work, and firing
compensations.6  This, in turn, has caused many to argue that removing this protective
legislation interfering with employer freedom to hire and fire would contribute to job
creation.  Plant-level flexibility has been advanced as a panacea for curing
unemployment.  Is it?
Reflecting on the notion of workplace flexibility a decade ago, Robert Boyer
stressed that it is, from its very definition, associated with productivity.  Higher
6 Other relevant legislation includes law 1892/1990 regulating part-time work.  For a recent
synopsis in English, see (European Commission 1997:60-6).  The perennial inability (or unwillingness)
of the Greek state to enforce labour legislation, however, is a factor stressed by many analysts (see,
e.g., Georgakopoulou 1995).
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flexibility is aimed at stimulating overall productivity.  Assuming that the
contemporary unemployment problem facing Greece and other European countries
stems from the inability of their labour markets to absorb technological change and
adapt to increased international competition because of Fordist rigidities, flexibility
ought to be associated with an increased capacity to modernize which, in turn, would
have a positive long-term job-creating influence.  The association, however, is not
causal.
In the short-term it is the rate of investment, the growth of the market, and the
skill of the work-force that condition the rate at which technical change is
incorporated into the economic system.  In the long term, it is only the
emergence of a coherent technological system that will enable cumulative
growth of productivity to be achieved. (Boyer 1988:230)
To the extent that investment remains timid, the market sluggish, and the
labour force unskilled, no such technologically advanced system is likely to emerge.
In that case, flexibility usually becomes but a euphemism for downgrading most of
the rights of wage earners (Gilbert et al. 1992; Pollert 1991; Rubery 1989; Hyman
1988).  Indeed, the danger looms large that approaching the ‘need for higher
flexibility’ as part of a larger plan for reducing short-term costs of production may
well end up being an obstacle to long-term changes in socio-productive organization,
which alone offers the best chance for sustainable job creation (Shaikh 1996).
Boyer’s argument is a good starting point for assessing the Greek experience,
especially since it helps account for developments in that sector of the economy which
is flexible in extremis, the informal sector.  Pondering over issues associated with the
nature of this sector requires a short detour.
As elsewhere in Mediterranean Europe, ‘invisible’ informal activities,
absorbing low-paid labour, and avoiding the reach of the state with regard both to the
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enforcement of labour legislation (safety, insurance, length of the workday, etc.) and
the observation of collective bargaining agreements are extremely widespread in
Greece, accounting for anything between 18 and 30% of the GNP
(Hadjimichalis/Vaiou 1990; Lolos 1989, 1991; Pavlopoulos 1987).  Informal activities
usually have been considered as factors contributing to ‘unemployment relief’ (see,
e.g., Leontidou 1993:62-6).  Considering the enormous flexibility associated with
them, however, they can, equally well serve as a laboratory for testing the promise of
flexibility.  Are informal activities cum flexible production associated with
technological innovation and employment creation?
Informal work takes many forms (Skolka 1985).  Hadjimichalis and Vaiou
(1990) have suggested the following fourfold categ rization: criminal activities;
profitably exploiting inadequacies of the formal regulatory system (mainl  d noting
tax evasion); reproduction of traditional forms of production (involving activities
such as petty-trade, illegal construction, tourism in summer, harvest of fruits and
vegetables in summer and spring, t-shirt production in autumn and winter); and those
generated by specific restructuring strategies of individual firms in agriculture,
industry, retail, and services.  Among all four, it is the last one that has been hailed as
a model for overcoming Fordist rigidities, onto the road of ‘flexible specialization’.
Relying on apparent success stories such as, most notably, Third Italy, the argument
has been put forward that the internal, plant-level flexibility associated with this form
of production will lead inevitably to technological upgrading on the basis of
computers and other multipurpose machinery and the emergence of ‘economies of
scope’.  Relying on batch-production techniques, these will be able to penetrate
market niches with just-in-time production, thereby increasing their productive
utilization and creating the prerequisites for further investment and productivity-
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increasing technological innovation.  This, in turn, will lead to considerable job
creation (see, e.g., Sabel/Zeitlin 1997; Sabel 1989; Wickens 1987; Sabel/Zeitlin 1985;
Piore/Sabel 1984).
The ‘flexible vision’, Boyer’s objections, and the Greek experience can now
be fruitfully joined.  Recent research on the evolution and intricacies of the Greek
informal sector indicates that, contrary to the expectations of the flexibility theorists,
plant-level flexibility has led neither to productivity-increasing technological
upgrading nor to sustainable job creation.  P lagidis (1997:158-70, 216-17), who
researched textile production in the Thessaloniki area, discovered that, despite the
general dynamism and adaptability characterizing the sector in the late 1980s, the use
of new technologies was conspicuously absent and that most comparative advantage
was derived from low-paid work, especially piecework and outwork.  Similarly,
Lyberaki (1988), who researched flexible small-medium enterprises, discovered that
Their flexibility and responsiveness [were] not geared towards differentiation
and product development but rather towards auxiliary activities….Flexibility
and responsiveness [appeared] to exhaust their beneficial potential in a
defensive/survival strategy; they [did] not appear capable of generating
expansion and growth. (Lyberaki 1988:328)
Even more tellingly, Moschonas/Droucopoulos (1993:116, 118) discovered
that in the period 1963-1990 the productivity gap between large (rigid) and small
(flexible) establishments in Greece widened by no less than 23%.  (Naturally, the gap
also widened in terms of wages.  Whereas in 1963 the annual remuneration per
employee in flexible establishments was 75.9% of its counterpart in large
establishments, by 1990 it had fallen to 67.1%.)
In their extensive research, encompassing flexible informal activities both in
agriculture and manufacturing in northern Greece, Hadjimichalis and Vaiou (1997)
reached largely similar conclusions.  Once again, flexibility was found to be primarily
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‘defensive’, increasingly failing to generate economies of scope and relying almost
exclusively on low production and management costs.  In the early 1990s, far from
offering a way out of the employment crisis characterizing the official economy,
informal activities were found to be in the midst of a severe crisis of their own.
Especially after 1993, a large number of them were forced to close down (according
to the researchers’ estimates, 30-40% of the textile units that had been founded
between 1981 and 1988) and lay off their workers.  To sch matize a rather complex
state of affairs, plant-level flexibility led not to flexible specialization, but to a
growing crisis of informalization; ot to sustained employment creation, but to a
frustrating increase in the (informal/invisible) jobless rate.
In the summer of 1998 the Greek government introduced new legislation in
the direction of more working-time flexibility.7  Under the new law, employers are
able to vary the length of the working week and the distribution of the hours worked
during the year.8  As stated in the law’s preamble, the government expects the
restructuring/ flexibilization of the labour market to ‘contribute decisively to the
preservation of existing and the formation of new jobs, as well as to improvement in
the overall competitiveness of the Greek economy’ (Elli iki Dimokratia 1998:23).  By
highlighting the problematic nature of the association between flexibility,
technological innovation, and productivity growth, and illustrating with a brief
reference to the experience of the Greek informal sector, however, I have suggested
7 This legal trend is international.  The UNCTAD recently estimated that, of the 373 national
legislative changes governing foreign investment between 1991 and 1994, only 5 were not in the
direction of greater flexibility (cited in Moody 1997:43).
8 Employers will be able to extend the workday up to ten hours for a period of up to six months.
Few failed to notice, however, that, anti-unemployment rhetoric aside, the law’s major short-term
effect will be reduction in job creation.  Moreover, the new law causes workers who in the past were
employed for extra hours during peak seasons to lose their overtime pay.
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why some of these high hopes, viewing flexibility as a panacea, may be misguided.9
The extent to which further flexibility will carry the day, however, depends largely on
the stance of the labour movement.
LOW UNION DENSITY, PROTEST, AND PROSPECTS FOR TRADE UNIONISM
III
The prophets of trade union doom in Greece rely on some hard data.  In the
1990s unions have come under increasing strain, membership has been declining and,
as the quote from the Financial Courier cited at the beginning of this paper suggests,
union discourse has been losing much of its erstwhile appeal.  Indeed, largely due to
unemployment, ‘power and initiative appear to have drifted from trade unions’
(OECD 1991:97).  But does this mean, as some have suggested, that unions are in the
process of dissolving?  What is precisely the nature of the retreat?  What causes it and
how can it be reversed?  Is it simply rising unemployment?  Moreover, how does this
retreat relate to the unions’ capacity to mobilize?  Do the two co-vary?  Answering
these questions and specifying the exact nature of the retreat is extremely important,
not the least because crucial policy prescriptions flow from the analysis that will be
made.
Greek authors and commentators who evoke the ‘resurgence of labour
quiescence’ theme (Shalev 1992) to describe long-term trends in the evolution of the
labour movement and the effects of unemployment usually conflate two levels of
9 See, also, Georgakopoulou (1995, 1996).  For a similar conclusion about Europe as a whole,
see Martin (1998:36-8).  Martin stresses the British experience, where increasing flexibility led not to
employment creation, but to the loss of jobs.  See also Nolan (1994), who, examining Europe and the
United States, shows both that unregulated markets do not necessarily correlate with low
unemployment and that the increased flexibility in employment has been brought about at the expense
of technological dynamism.  Authors such as Knudsen (1995), on the other hand, suggested that a
likely condition of technological innovation is employee participation.
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analysis, union membership and density on the one hand, and union mobilizing
potential on the other (see, e.g., Toutziarakis 1997).10  But in Greece (and other
countries of Mediterranean Europe), the correlation between density and mobilizing
capacity implicit in the blending is spurious.  Even if unemployment tends to drive
down trade union membership, it does not also erode labour’s capacity for job actions
of all sorts.
Historically, the repressive labour environment, characterized by limited
political-legal space, persistent state repression, and low living standards,
effectively precluded the institutionalization of the labour movement.  As a result,
membership has been low and unstable, and overall organization precarious.  This
situation of limited institutionalization continued also after World War II, during the
‘guided democracy’ of the 1950s and 1960s and after the restoration of
parliamentarism in the mid-1970s (I will return to these issues below).  After some
considerable gains in the period 1977-82, when union density grew from 35.8% to
36.7%, the traditionally low pattern set in again.  Among 24 OECD countries
Greece ranked 19th in 1988 (OECD 1991:101) and continued to experience declines
in the 1990s, when union density fell from 34.1% in 1990 (OECD 1994:184) to
27% in 1995 (Koukoules 1998:104).
Low and declining union density, however, did not lead to a low propensity to
strike.  On the contrary, recent quantification of labour disputes revealed that
10 Of course, this tendency to extrapolate statements about trade union strength or weakness on
the basis exclusively of union density is not particularly Greek.  For instance, most of the recent
comparative scholarship on the impact of globalization on trade union strength relies on figures of trade
union density.  For a succinct review of the main themes, see Lange/Scruggs (1997a).  On the other
hand, there is a large literature stressing that there is no automatic link between high unionization and
militancy.  For a review, see Viss r (1992).  The literature examining the factors explaining strike
incidence is literally voluminous.  For succinct reviews, see Franzosi (1995) and Edwards/Hyman
(1994).  One common theme that needs to be borne in mind for what follows, however, is that although
economic conditions (unemployment, inflation, etc.) are not to be discarded, their effects on strike rates
have been found to be limited and extremely unequal.
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Greece is the country which, if anything, defies the pan-European ‘labour
acquiescence’ trend.  In a recent study covering the 15 member states of the
European Union, plus the three members of the European Free Trade area (Iceland,
Norway, and Switzerland), Greece, apparently unaffected by rising unemployment,
ranked first in terms of most of the measures suggested, a slight variation of Shorter
and Tilly’s (1974) conceptual scheme (Aligisakis 1997).  These involve the Strik
Rate (number of strikers by number of wage earners –SR); the Rate of Days not
Worked (the ratio of days not worked because of strike action by the number of
wage earners –RDNW); the Mobilization Rate (number of strikers by number of
strikes –MR); and the Striker Determination Rate(days not worked by number of
strikers –SDR).  The first two measures comprise the Relative Index of Propensity
to Strike (RIPS) and the third and fourth the Structural Index of Propensity to Strike
(SIPS).  Added together, they form the General Index of Propensity to Strike
(GIPS).  The data are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Strike Propensity in Greece and Other European Countries
1980-85 1985-90 1990-93 1970-93
GR/rank EU GR/rank EU GR/rank EU GR/rank EU
SR 0.30/1 0.12 0.49/1 0.07 0.68/1 0.05 0.40/1 0.10
RDNW 0.74/1 0.31 4.06/1 0.19 4.41/1 0.14 2.52/1 0.3
MR 0.76/7 1.30 2.33/3 1.25 4.06/2 1.40 1.35/3 1.18
SDR 2.46/12 2.50 8.18/2 2.60 6.46/3 2.61 6.20/6 2.91
RIPS* +2.56/3 +7.19/1 +7.89/1 +6.10/1
SIPS* -0.99/10 +2.76/1 +2.80/1 +1.14/3
GIPS* +1.57/4 +9.95/1 +10.69/1 7.24/1
*Figures for the RIPS, SIPS, and GIPS are recalculated so that the average for all countries equals
zero.  Propensity to strike increases where the sign is positive, and falls where the sign is negative.
Source: Adapted from Aligisakis (1997); ILO (1990-95)
Whereas in the early 1980s Greece ranked low in terms of the mobilization
and striker determination rates (respectively, Shorter and Tilly’s ‘size’ and
‘duration’), in the mid-late 1980s and the 1990s this was reversed.  For the last decade
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or so, strikes in Greece have been characterized by high frequency, long duration, and
large average size.  It also merits attention that, in terms of its General Index of
Propensity to Strike for the period 1970-93 (7.244), Greece ranks far above second
ranked Italy (4.813), the country usually cited as the hotbed of industrial unrest
(Edwards/Hyman 1994).
This remarkably high propensity to strike subsided after 1993, but the trend is
by no means unambiguous.  Although the number of strikes, strikers, and hours lost
declined abruptly between 1993 and 1995, 1996 (a year when there an upsurge in
unemployment) was marked by increases in all three measures.  This was especially
so in terms of the hours lost because of strikes.  Compared to 1995, the hours lost in
1996 increased by 70% (Koukoules 1998:111).  Though it remains to be seen whether
this new upsurge in labour militancy will continue, it is nonetheless evident that to
speak of ‘labour acquiescence’ in Greece is, to say the least, premature.
Moreover, regardless of short-term developments, the prediction that strikes
will somehow wither away in the future seems inconceivable on historical grounds.
As Franzosi (1995:347-48) argued, since strikes are ultimately caused by conflict over
the distribution of scarce resources, long-term prosperity is an absolute prerequisite of
a society free of conflict and such a state of affairs nobody dares to predict.  Instead,
in ‘each European country sudden eruptions of new conflict have appeared at several
moments in history and there is no reason why they may not recur in the future’
(Leisink et al. 1996:14).
Challenging as it may be, adequate explanation —and possible theory building
on the basis— of Greek striking patterns lies beyond the scope of this paper.  (Any
future effort, however, must be based on Franz si’s (1995) superb blending of
economic, organizational, institutional, and political explanatory factors.)  But the
Page 19
extreme nature of the divergence between unionization and mobilization rates in the
context of rising unemployment, flying in the face of the usual assumptions in the
political economy literature, Franzosi’s findings (who discovered that ‘union
organizational strength and strike activity [go]…hand in hand’ —p. 345), as well as
resource mobilization theory (see, e.g., ÌcAdam/McCarthy/Zald 1996), certainly
calls for an explanation.  This too, however, is exceedingly complex to be fully
pursued in the context of a short paper.  All I can aspire to do here is suggest what I
think may be prerequisites for an adequate explanation.  For that we must turn to
history.
In particular, I want to suggest that the Greek labour movement’s
contemporary crisis of low union density without a simultaneous crisis of mobilizing
capacity (and despite rising unemployment) cannot be adequately explained unless we
take into account the historically learned patterns of labour activation.  These we may
provisionally dub ‘historically cumulative labour strategies’ (see Lipsig-Mumme
1989; see also Crouch 1993).  This notion bears important parallels with Charles
Tilly’s (1978) notion of ‘collective action repertoires’, and refers to the ways in which
labour movements learn to turn their resources into collective action.  Profoundly
interactive and relational (Tilly’s subsequent studies of ‘contentious repertoires’ stress
that the concept refers to pairs of politically constituted actors, one of whom is the
state –see, e.g., Tilly 1998), these ways depend a great deal on the legacy of what
Valenzuela (1992) termed ‘mode of a labour movements’ political insertion’ into the
socio-political system (see also, Collier and Collier 1991; S feriades 1998a).  Below I
will attempt to sketch what I think are the crucial features of the Greek case.
IV
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The workers’ movement in Greece never knew a period of genuine legality.
The things which a lot of people of diverse social backgrounds experienced in
the course of the last military dictatorship [of 1967-74] were to [the int war]
workers...a permanent condition under all the regimes, republican, monarchist,
or military.  Arbitrary arrests, house searches without a warrant night and day,
beatings, torture, humiliation, detention, exiles.  And when the workers, badly
beaten and bleeding would bring a charge to court, or publicize their
predicament in the press, the cliché reaction was: ‘typical communist lies’.
(Stinas 1985:145, my translation)
Because of late industrialization, a labour movement emerged relatively late in
Greece, only in the last quarter of the 19th century.  The economic behaviour of the
Greek elites, largely an outcome of the country’s semi-peripheral articulation into the
world system and the structure of economic opportunities that this articulation
entailed, created an environment conducive to the exclusion of the new collective
actor.  Excessive elite reliance on trade with a concomitant hesitance to invest in
industry, and a strong penchant for financial speculation and economic dventuris ,
produced a fluid labour market and made projects for the strategic incorporation of the
labour movement appear both relatively expensive and useless (see Hadziio if
1993:447; Liakos 1993:174-76).
This does not mean, of course, that no political will for such an incorporation
existed.  Especially during the first period of the Venizelist rule in the early/mid-
1910s, exceptionally progressive labour legislation was introduced only to be stalled
by acerbic employer resistance (Mavrogordatos 1983).  During the interwar period,
repression returned to centre stage.  It has been tellingly argued that, unlike the
situation in western Europe, where the evolution of state-labour relations could be
described by the scheme ‘prohibition à tolerance à recognition,’ in Greece the
evolution has been distressingly S syphian: ‘prohibition à tolerance à prohibition’
(Liakos 1993: 163).
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The extremely narrow political-legal space allotted to the labour movement,
the constant intervention of the state in the internal life of trade unions, and the
coercive presence of the police and army in virtually all forms of labour protest
precluded the ideological incorporation of the labour movement and produced an
intensely conflictive political culture.  As a result a vicious circle was set in motion:
the more coercive the state became, the more coercion was needed (Seferiad s
1998b).
These structural features had two important consequences.  First, the labour
movement was characterized by the strong role that politics and party organisations
played in its operation.  Unlike the situation in western Europe, such organisations
had a longer history than trade unions and, as a result, trade-union discourse
developed not as a forerunner but as a sub-species of political discourse.  Even more
crucially, by precluding genuine union autonomy, the constrictive political
environment made it appear that having a well-defined political goal was a
prerequisite for undertaking meaningful trade-union action.  Playing by the rules of
the game was largely untenable, so the game had to be changed.
Second, as mentioned earlier, the labour movement was characterized by
intense segmentation and an almost permanent organizational fluidity.  Although trade
unions and the outer marks of a generally robust trade union life existed, they had
only limited functional content, concealing a constantly low union density,
membership instability, and a broad array of organizational irrationalities (such as the
inability to hold regular conferences, collect union dues, etc.).  This had contradictory
consequences regarding the political sociology of trade union leaders.  Whereas it was
relatively easy for them to rise to the leadership (especially when they were linked to
the state), the bureaucratic structures they were erecting were exceedingly weak,
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unable to control the movement and, much less, ensure its incorporation into channels
of vertical communication with the state.  This, in turn, precluded the
institutionalization of the movement, giving it an informal, intermittently convulsive
dynamic, which, though explicable, was usually unforeseen.
Itself a reflection of limited institutionalization, this convulsive dynamic
tended to spread to society at large though informal communication networks, not
through the industrial shop floor.  It is not surprising, then, that its relationship with
unemployment was neither direct nor predictable –contextual and political
considerations were always of paramount significance.
Unions had a low membership, but, whenever they called militant action, the
response was likely to be significant.  An important instance of this convulsive
dynamic haracterizing the labour movement was the way that small confrontations
would snowball to engulf entire regions, quite irrespective of local unemployment
rates.  Dynamic as they may have been, however, these confrontations would not
bring about much in the way of solid organizational gains for the official trade union
movement.  Though a constant source of anxiety for the state, labour militancy was
organizationally intractable.
A related feature was that popular demands and representations (often with a
markedly pre-industrial hue) were prominent in trade-union discourse and the
opposite, a situation in which trade-union practices tended to influence phenomenally
innocuous popular activities (such as, most notably, around popular housing).  This
informal mode of communication between unions and their potential membership
rendered labour’s mobilizing capacity largely immune to unemployment’s adverse
effects, and became particularly evident during the years of the German occupation in
the 1940s, when the labour movement played a decisive role in the national resistance
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movement.  The eruption of a wave of political strikes in 1942-43 (when more that
100 of them broke out) and the emergence of new participatory institutions despite the
coercive presence of the German occupation forces, essentially abolished the old state
and created hopes for the development of rational rg n zational structures.  These,
however, were viciously crushed in the 1946-49 civil war.
As trade unions were denied all autonomy by the repressive state in the 1950s
and 1960s, the problem of trade union under-representation increased.  At a time
when genuine labour activists were persecuted, a
caste of leaders developed who were ironically known as ergatopateres
(workers’ fathers).  Sustained by patronage relations with the government,
they also confected a spurious legitimacy by convening rigged conferences,
de-registering troublesome branches, and similar stratagems.  Since their
income was received from the government rather than from members’ [dues],
they were under no real pressure to act effectively as workers’ representatives.
(Kritsantonis 1992: 613-14)
This period further crystallized the Greek labour movement’s contentious
repertoire.  If union autonomy was severely compromized by the actions of a
repressive state, then the response would have to be similarly political, albeit
organizationally erratic and intractable.  The eruption of labour militancy that marked
the mid-1960s took place at a time of low unemployment.  Judging by the labour
movement’s history and the fact this militancy developed largely outside union
organizational channels, however, it is very unlikely that labour activism would have
been deterred if unemployment were higher.  It is also telling that the militancy of the
1960s was spearheaded by political, not narrowly economic, developments
(Seferiades 1998c).  The major goals pursued were also political, involving the
liberalization of the post civil-war regime and an end to royal interference into the
workings of the political system.  As in the past, politics was understood not as the
culmination of economic demands, but as a prerequisite for their meaningful
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articulation.  This being the case, it is not surprising that membership in the trade
unions was relegated to secondary status and union density remained low as usual,
below the 20% mark.
After 1974 there was considerable liberalization and efforts were made for the
institutionalization of the labour movement.  Union autonomy remained
compromised, however, and union affairs open to government intervention despite the
formal guarantees of Article 12 of the 1975 Constitution (Zambarloukou 1996; de
Roo/Jagtenberg 1994; IRS 1991:25; Mavrogordatos 1988).  As a result, the Greek
workers’ traditionally low propensity to organize along with their strong penchant for
plebiscitarian political action remained, this time in the context of progressively rising
unemployment.  This helps explain both the outbreak of intermittent strike waves in
the background of continually low union density and the enormous political
factionalism that beset the trade union movement in the late 1970s and 1980s.  It also
lies at the core of contemporary union dilemmas.
V
If, as seen, low union density and general organizational feebleness does not
reflect a reduced willingness and/or capacity to act (Offe/Wiesenthal 1985), it does
however, limit this action’s effectiveness.  As Vi er (1992:23-4) argued, high union
membership may not be a prerequisite of labour militancy, but it is necessary if this
militancy is to become a truly ‘strategic resource’, capable of being used in a
conscious and purposeful manner.  Both in the recent and the more distant past, the
Greek labour movement waged titanic battles, but most of them ended in defeat.
Despite the momentous eruption of May 1936, the movement was unable to stop the
imposition of the M taxas dictatorship in the in erwar period.  And though the 1964-
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66 strike wave has tellingly been described as the prelude to the pan-European 1968
(Vernardakis/Mavris 1991), the labour movement was subsequently so numbed that
scholars have naturally concluded that the colonels’ dictatorship had little need
repress it further (see, e.g., B rmeo 1995).  The strike waves of the late 1970s and
1980s were successful in gaining economic concessions and opening up labour’s
political-legal space in the short term, but were unable either to end state intervention
in internal trade union affairs or, as seen above, effectively address the problems of
low wages and informal labour markets.
In the 1990s the defeat involves what Lipsig-Mumme (1989:230) called
‘qualitative decline’, a lessened ability to influence the political, social, and economic
agenda.  This, in turn, is manifested in a variety of ways, including a large number
strikes lost, the inability to influence legislation, and the increasing distancing of
PASOK, the ruling socialist party, away from union influence.  Moreover, unions may
be losing their ability to influence the ‘general public’ and create a favourable
ideological climate.  Data on this issue are difficult to come by, but according to
survey 1.3b of Eurobarometer 48 (Commission Eur péenne 1997:B.5), more Greeks
‘tend not to trust’ trade unions (49%) than those who do (45%).  (On the other hand,
the percentage of positive attitudes is considerably higher than the EU15 average of
38%).
The irony of the matter is that all this is happening at a time when, at long last,
the movement has been granted the status of an official ‘social partner’, especially
after the introduction of Law 1876/1990 establishing free collective bargaining at the
peak level, and laying the grounds for what Crouch (1994:210) aptly called ‘a very
loose neo-corporatism’.  Although, as seen, unemployment has been rising, nowadays
the General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) enjoys not only the freedom its quasi-
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clandestine predecessors lacked, but has its own research institute (INE/GSEE), the
opportunity to assess and evaluate contemporary trends in the labour market, and the
chance to reflect on international experience.
Developments in the spring of 1998 represent a meaningful condensation of
contemporary labour movement dilemmas.  Reacting to policies of welfare-state
retrenchment and privatization, teachers and bank employees came out on strike and
confronted the police on several occasions.  Though they were able to demonstrate to
the privatizing state and the elites that the route to labour-market flexibilization is
going to be long and thorny, their strikes, unable to spearhead a larger movement, met
with defeat.  What is worse, unionists estimate that in their wake union membership
seems to have further declined (Balaouras 1998).
This being so, it would appear that the biggest challenge facing the labour
movement in the end of the 1990s is to overcome its historical organizat onal
feebleness precluding the strategic and purposeful deployment of worker militancy.
What are the prospects?
VI
In light of the continually high strike propensity of the labour movement, it is
clear that any search for solutions to the present crisis must avoid the pitfalls of
environmental determinism, and approach unions as organizing agencies, or strategic
actors (Leising et al. 1996).  After all, recent research in political economy has amply
demonstrated that environmental factors such as unemployment are, by themselves,
extremely unstable and weak predictors of union decline (see, e.g., Visser 1994;
Lange/Scruggs 1997a, 1997b; Richards/Polavieja 1997).  Unions in Greece are not
facing a crisis because capitalist restructuring and high unemployment have made
workers too afraid or too segmented to fight.  The strike data we examined indicate
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that workers are anything but tamed.  Neither are unions the victims of the much
discussed ‘free rider’ problem suggested by rational choice theorists –as a rule,
militant strikes are far more costly to the individual than deciding to join a union.  It
is, rather, because unions have failed to convey to their potential membership why it
is important to belong to a union in a manner sufficiently strong to overcome the
labour movement’s historically embedded pl biscitarian contentious repertoire and its
landmark low propensity to organize.  That is, to convince workers that union ‘goals
matter to them, that that their own participation makes a difference, that others will
join, and that together they stand a chance of success’ (Klandermans cited in Visser
1994:85).
The way the union leadership has been trying to address this problem over the
last few years has been characterized by an effort to cherish the unions’ recently
earned ‘social partnership’ status, albeit at the expense of their traditional social-
movement outlook.  The GSEE has prepared elaborate proposals for purposes of
conducting ‘social dialogue’ (see GSEE/ADEDY 1997), which, though well
documented and critical of neo-classical policies, are based on the assumption that the
solution to the Greece’s economic and social problems lies in co-operation and
consensus-building.  Employers and the state must be made to understand why low
wages and further informalization of the labour market offer no solution to the
problem of unemployment, it is argued, but this can be achieved merely through
competent argumentation.  Concurrently, the movement’s traditional politiciza i  is
silently abandoned in the name of an increasingly technical discourse (videGSEE’s
otherwise excellent proposals about the promise of the 35-hour week –INE/GSEE
1996) and the goal of ‘union autonomy’.  Although party factionalism inside GSEE
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bodies continues, unions increasingly abstain from offering informed commentary on
political issues.  In short, the union leadership has sought to address the problem of
low membership by attempting to curb the labour movement’s historical
conforntationsim and politicization.  It is reasoned that this will create the conditions
for the organizational r tionalization of unions, and will allow them to play an
important role in Greece’s advancing social and political ‘modernization’, the
rhetorical buzzword of the late 1990s (see, e.g., Protopappas 1997, 1998).
This stance has earned the GSEE a good name with employers and European
Commission analysts,11 but has done nothing to arrest declining density, or lead the
quasi-wildcat strikes which broke out to success.  As elsewhere in Europe, worker
‘collective willingness to act’ has been light-heartedly squandered and this has
contributed to a net decline in ‘union power’ (Offe/Wiesenthal 1985: Hyman
1994:128).  In the summer of 1998, GSEE officials could not conceal their profound
disappointment with the evolution and prospects of the ‘social dialogue’ (Linardos-
Rylmon 1998).  George F. Koukoules (1997:70) described the situation as follows:
The present crisis…embroils the trade union movement into the following
contradiction: on the one hand, because of the several favourable institutional
reforms that have been put in place in recent years, it is a privileged
interlocutor in negotiations with employers and the state.  On the other hand,
neither the employers nor the state show any willingness to grant any
concessions to the unions but, on the contrary, keep asking unions to concede
more and more (my translation).
Koukoules concludes tellingly that ‘unless the union movement finds ways to
overcome this contradiction, it will suffer its most decisive defeat’.
The problem, of course, is not particularly Greek.  In the hard economic times
of the 1980s and 1990s, governments and employers the world over can be expected
11 Take, for instance, the following appraisal by the European Commission: ‘On the whole,
labour unions seem to have become more mature and responsible and this has been reflected in their
behaviour in recent years’ (European Commission 1997:54)
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to sustain the regimes of consensual industrial relations established in the post-war era
‘only to the extent that unions underwrite policies of retrenchment and restraint’
(Hyman 1994:115, emphasis in the original) –even in cases where the state does not
seek the liquidation of the welfare state, but merely its replacement with what Rhodes
(1997) aptly called ‘competitive corporatism’.  All the same, union leaderships have
tended to cling to the paradise lost of societal corporatism, even when struggles break
out.  Kim Moody (1997a:54) gave a fine description of the process:
A fight is called for and sometimes waged by these…leaders.  Typically, it is
waged in the name of the old stable relationship.  For the top leaders there is
no contradiction.  There is, however, an underlying contradiction between the
new demands of capital and the unions’ old line of defence.  Stability is gone,
but the paradise lost of stability and normal bargaining continues to inform the
actions of the leaders even when they are confrontational.  Their actions
sometimes push forward even though their eyes are focused clearly on the
past.  That this contradiction is likely to limit the effectiveness of the unions is
obvious…
What is particular (and ironic) about the Greek case is that the societal-
corporatist ‘past’ Moody is talking about has never existed.  And, evidently, it is not
likely to come about in the 1990s.
On the other hand, concession bargaining, increasingly seen as ‘conceding
defeat without attempting to wage a fight’ (Balaouras 1998), has eroded union
credibility.  If, historically, workers were unwilling to join unions because of state
repression, in the 1990s they are sceptical because of continually limited union
effectiveness (compounded, of course, by low density and rising unemployment).  In
an environment of continual concession bargaining the ‘free rider’ dilemma is
reversed.  If no benefits are to be won by collective bargaining, the theoretically
challenging task ceases to be explaining why the outsiders refuse to join a union, but
why the insiders have not yet left.
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VII
It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude by offering some tentative thoughts on
how the problem may be overcome.  I propose to do so along the six complementary
dimensions for conducting research on union strategy in the era of rising
unemployment and declining union membership recently suggested by Leisink et al
(1996).  The authors believe that, though not exhaustive, these dimensions are
essential for unions to examine if they want to overcome contemporary crisis and
organizational dilemmas.  They involve the following: missio  of unions, solidarity,
items on the bargaining agenda, r lations with the state, relations with the employers,
and internationalism.  Though some of the remarks below read like a manifesto, they
are to be seen also as summary of a future research agenda.
(1) Union mission: Economic stringency and rising unemployment put in doubt the
post-war mode of union representation relying on sustained GNP growth and
relatively tight labour markets (Hyman 1994:114).  If this is the case for countries
of the European core, it is much more true for countries such as Greece where a
long heritage of political repression and ‘an unusually autocratic set of employers
never made free collective bargaining an option’ for trade unions (Kritsantonis
1992:619).  Clinging to notions of ‘social partnership’ (new in Greece, but, for
practical purposes, also hopelessly outdated) at a time of rising unemployment can
only lead to concession bargaining and, through that, to further erosion of union
credibility and strength.  Greek unions cannot overcome their problem of low
density unless they actively re-politicize their discourse, transcending the
immediate implications of work relations at the enterprise level and exposing
social forces behind economic phenomena, which lie at the core of the problem of
rising unemployment.  This is especially true in the era of globaliz tion.  As
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Hyman (1988:59) put it, ‘the what and the why as well as the ow of production
decisions [are] of key relevance’.  In the 1990s and beyond, ‘the labour
movement’s old demand that production should be determined by social need
rather than profit assumes new meaning’.  In keeping with the historical traditions
of the Greek labour movement, Greek unions must seek a contentious,
encompassing, social-movement kind of unionism.  According to Moody
(1997b:4-5), this means a movement that will be deeply democratic, militant in
collective bargaining, political in acting independently of the retreating forces of
social democracy, and universal in terms of the scope of the demands that it puts
forward.
(2) Solidarity: Both in Greece and internationally authors have long suggested that
union decline in the context of rising unemployment is causally linked with a
crisis in traditional working-class values (see, e.g., Koukoules 1997; Visser 1994).
What most of these analyses fail to point out, however, is that solidarity is, and
has always been, constructed –no golden era of organic labour unity has ever
existed (Moody 1997b: chapter 7; Hyman 1992, 1994: 117-19).  It follows that
declining solidarity is not so much a cause of declining union density, as it is an
effect.  As in the past, unions can and must address the problem.  In Greece
special emphasis must be placed on five categories of workers.  Those employed
in the informal sector, women, youth, immigrants (see Baldwin-Edwards 1998;
Petrinioti 1993), and, of course, the unemployed.  Thoughts on their particular
demands and how they can be articulated with those of the rest of the union
movement already exist (see Hadjimichalis/Vaiou 1997:218-19; Sianou 1997:164;
Katsoridas 1998:85-88, 1994:36-8,), but need to be developed further, not no
much by scholars as by union leaders.
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(3) New items on the bargaining agenda: The most direct way unions can enhance
solidarity is by reconsidering and substantially innovating the bargaining agenda
in ways that will have a positive effect on the working class as a whole, especially
the unemployed.  This, of course, means taking to heart the interests of
unorganized workers, especially those belonging to the five categories mentioned
above.  Unions must frame and pursue the interests of their own membership in
ways which do not ‘exclude and oppose those of other constituencies’ (Hyman
1994:120).  Employment creation can and must be immediately put on the
bargaining agenda.  The problem is particularly thorny in Greece, however,
because of the unequal density of public and private sector unions (the famous
‘insider-outsider’ issue), a problem compounded by the rising numbers of the
unemployed.  Scholars have long noted that this situation has tended to bias the
bargaining agenda in favour of the public sector (Fakiolas 1985), tying unions to a
core and ageing workforce and making them unable to defend the interests of the
rest (either because they are not unio ized or because they work in the black
market).  Many have also argued that, for the sake of protecting the interests of
private sector workers and the unemployed, public sector workers ought to
moderate their demands (see, e.g., Manos 1998).  However, the conclusion does
not flow from the premise.  By compromising their typically militant stance, 12
however, public sector unions will not help private sector unions solve their low-
density problem.  One can hardly expect a smashed backbone to help a meagre
body gain weight.  On the contrary, international experience and social
movements theory (see, e.g., Tarrow 1998: chapter 9) suggest that by extending
their demands and flexing their mobilizing muscle, so-called elite union
12 Precise data are lacking, but it is widely known that, as elsewhere in Europe, public sector
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organizations (such as the public sector workers in Greece) have lowered
otherwise high costs of participation and collective action and opened precious
new space to previously unorganized workers and other strata, thereby improving
their aggregate density (Moody 1997b:278-79; Lipsig-Mumme 1989).  Unless
unions undertake extensive campaigns to address the issues in a comprehensive
manner along the lines suggested above, however, a contentious mobilizi g
strategy might be misunderstood, threatening to turn once sympathetic people
against unions.  These campaigns must stress that new items are being put on the
bargaining agenda and hammer home that the old maxim, ‘an injury to one is an
injury to all’, remains.
(4) Relations with employers: L i ing et al. (1996:23) have argued that nowadays it is
pointless to try charting beforehand a good-for-all industrial relations’ practice,
either co-operative or conflictive.  Instead, unions must ‘master the whole
repertoire of union-employer relationships and be able to choose whichever model
seems appropriate’ (see also Olney 1996).  This is probably true, but what will be
appropriate depends to a large extent on the nature of the demands unions put
forward.  For instance, considering economic crisis and unemployment to be
quasi-natural phenomena and ossifying the notion of a positive business climate
can only lead to concession bargaining.  In times of economic strain, versions of
‘business unionism’ and ‘productivity coalitions’ essentially mean an end to
unionism.  In the 1990s and beyond, genuine flexibility in union industrial
relations practice presupposes clearly demarcated lines and an aggressive program
of requisitions.  ‘Institutional commitments to labour peace, the avoidance of non-
economic issues, and reduction of strike militancy…[have all been found to] do
____________________________
workers have been the lead group of most strikes (Kritsantonis 1992:625-26).
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workers a...disservice’ (Cohn 1993:226).  Even in cases where advanced demands
put forward cannot be won, unions can gain a great deal by approaching the issues
in a politically provocative manner, exposing specific social interests behind given
proposals (taking special care to demonstrate how specific business practices fail
to alleviate unemployment), and campaigning to show why the existing balance of
social forces prevents a better outcome.  Especially during the time of negotiations
for a National General Collective Agreement, these can be transformed into highly
successful union recruitment campaigns.
(5) Relations with the state: If, as has been pointed out above, societal corporatism is
gone, there is no point in daydreaming about it.  The sooner union leaders realise
this, the better.  As ‘oppositions that never become governments, unions must
fight from the outside’ (Moody 1997b:285).  Of course, this does not mean that
unions must stop talking to the state.  But unions, more than scholars, must, once
again, come to grips with the fact that, particularly in the 1990s, the state’s role
has been to guarantee ‘control of the major means of production, distribution,
communication, and exchange by private, inherently undemocratic banks and
corporations’ (Panitch 1996:108).  It follows that negotiations can no longer
exhaust themselves in the effort to solidifying an imaginary social partnership
with ‘socialist monetarism’.  Instead, unions must seek to clarify to the workers
the nature of the issues involved including the state’s and the unions’ respective
positions, and use the publicity associated with peak-level negotiations as a
fulcrum for establishing a relationship both with other social movements and
workers’ movements in other countries.  As with many other items on this agenda,
however, here too the problem is one of agency.  As Moody (1997a:54) argued,
the step from a merely symbolic to an ideological or even institutional ‘social
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partnership’ between the labour bureaucracy and capital’s bureaucracy and the
state is not always a big one.  In Greece, the current Under-secretary of Labour,
Evangelos Protoppapas (particular agile in promoting the ‘accede or die’
ideology), was GSEE’s last president.  Will future labour leaders be prepared to
forfeit their potential political careers?  No answer can be given, of course, but the
outcome will depend to a large extent on whether or not unions combine their
drive to grow in numbers with one for greater internal democracy and leadership
accountability.  Contrary to earlier assessments (Streek 1988), we now know that
the two can be compatible (see Moody 1997:275-77; Hyman 1994:124-25).
(6) Internationalism: Much in the logic of concession bargaining rests on the notion
of national competitiveness.  The argument runs something like the following:
Workers must accept further wage cuts and the dismantling of labour legislation,
because otherwise the national economy will lose whatever competitive edge it
possesses.  The questionable technical merits of this argument notwithstanding, its
common-sense prowess is, nevertheless, depressingly evident.  It can be addressed
only if one takes into account that it its being monotonously repeated the world
over.  This requires the international co-operation of union forces,
internationalism.  Though scholars are just beginning to discuss the issue, noting
the enormous opportunities and difficulties involved (e.g., Moody 1997ab;
Goetschy 1996; Hyman 1996), it seems warranted to suggest that an international




The first part of this paper briefly examined the merits of neo-classical arguments
regarding the causes of the recent upsurge in Greek unemployment.  I showed that the
view according to which unemployment is caused by high wages rests on a weak
empirical foundation, and suggested that at least the Greek experience casts doubt on
the view that labour-market flexibilization can serve as a sustainable cure to
unemployment.  The focus in the second, and major, part of the paper has been on
unions.  Unlike the situation in most European countries, rising unemployment has
not affected the mobilizing capacity of the Greek labour movement.  More than a
century after its emergence, however, this movement has yet to overcome its
historically embedded low union density.  This may not prevent the outbreak of
militant strikes, but hampers their effectiveness.  In recent years union leaders have
attempted to address this problem by progressively abandoning the movement’s
traditional politicization, and by trying to check its penchant for confrontational
action, in favour of a co-operative industrial relations model.  In the context of
economic crisis and rising unemployment, however, this has led to concession
bargaining which, instead of improving, further worsened the problem of declining
union credibility and density.  I have suggested that, contrary to orthodox
prescriptions, the way forward for unions is not to undo militant traditions, but to
enrich, deepen, and enhance them.-
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